o n th e w orking of th e in s titu tio n a l sy stem outw eighs th e n eg ativ e d irec t effects of c o rru p tio n o n grow th. W e also find t h a t th e in te ra c tio n am ong in s titu tio n s them selves m a tte rs . T h is u n d ersco res th e im p o rta n c e of ta k in g in to acco u n t th e co m p lete in s titu tio n a l s e t tin g w hen stu d y in g c o rru p tio n , b o th in th e o ry as well as in em pirics.
In tro d u ctio n
T h e U nited N atio n s' to p anti-crim e official, A ntonio C osta, estim ates th a t Zaire an d N igeria, tw o of A frica's h ard est-h it states, have lost some $5 billion *We th a n k R o b b e rt M aseland for his useful com m ents an d suggestions. Please send all correspondence to A. de Vaal, Nijm egen School of M anagem ent, D ep artm en t of Economics, P.O . Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, th e N etherlands. Em ail: a.devaal@ fm .ru.nl each in th e last few years to corruption. In P ak istan , an estim ated 30 p ercen t of th e price of all public works p ro jects goes to kickbacks an d bribes, while in B angladesh co rru p tio n eats up ab o u t h alf of all foreign investm ents (Steven son, 2003) . B u t co rru p tio n is not only a th ird -w o rld phenom enon. W hile it is un d en iab ly m ore prevalent in a u th o rita ria n less developed countries, also dem ocratic, w estern societies are n o t free of corruption. For exam ple, a 2002 p arliam e n tary enquiry in th e N eth erlan d s showed th a t th e D u tch co n stru c tio n in d u stry p a rtic ip a te d in illegal practices, ran g in g from fraud, unjustified subsidies an d license issuance to real b rib ery an d m oney or favours to indi vidual p o litician s or higher-ranking public servants (van den Heuvel, 2005) .
O verall, a W orld B ank In s titu te stu d y estim ates th e costs due to co rru p tio n in b o th rich an d developing countries to b e a $1000 billion a year (W orld B ank, 2004) . O th er studies show th a t co rru p tio n is d etrim en tal to grow th as it lowers dom estic investm ents (M auro, 1995) , th e inflow of foreign di rect investm ents (Wei, 1997) , in tern atio n al tra d e (Lam bsdorff, 1999) or th e p ro d u ctiv ity an d q u ality of public investm ent p ro jects (Tanzi & D avoodi, 1997) . F u rth erm o re, Mo (2001) shows th a t co rru p tio n creates sociopolitical in stab ility which, by creatin g u n certainty, lowers p ro d u ctiv ity an d econom ic grow th. E m pirically, th e re is b ro ad consensus th a t co rru p tio n is d etrim en tal to th e econom ic perform ance of countries on th e long term . T his is in sh arp co n trast w ith th e th e o re tic al lite ra tu re on co rru p tio n an d grow th. For a long tim e cor ru p tio n was tre a te d as a s ta n d a rd d isto rtio n . W ith co rruption, resources are spent on b rib ery in stead of p ro d u ctio n , reducing th e efficient allocation of re sources an d h am p erin g econom ic grow th. However, th e re are also altern ativ e views. Leff (1964) , for instance, argues th a t th o se criticizing co rru p tio n often seem to have in m ind bureaucracies th a t are w orking to pro m o te econom ic developm ent. B u t if governm ents are p rim arily in terested in reaching o th er goals (e.g. staying in control, self-enrichm ent), a re-evaluation of th e effects of co rru p tio n m ay b e w arran ted . B rib ery th e n allows en trep ren eu rs to gain influence on th e decision-m aking process, fostering econom ic perform ance by reducing u n certain ty an d su p p o rtin g th e innovative activ ities of en trep re neurs. A sim ilar view is expressed by H u n tin g to n (1968), who stresses th e role of co rru p tio n in greasing th e wheels of b u reau cracy . B rib e ry can be an effective w ay of su rm o u n tin g laws or regulations th a t h am p er econom ic ac tiv ity . B y th e sam e token: w hen governm ent procedures are dilatory, speed m oney m ight help to speed u p b u reau c ra tic decision m aking. Finally, it is argued th a t co rru p tio n enhances grow th due to b rib e bidding com petition.
As m ore efficient en trep ren eu rs can afford to offer higher bribes, co rru p tio n facilitates th a t p ro jects are assigned to th e m ost efficient firm s (Beck an d M aher, 1986; Lien, 1986) .
T hese views are not uncontested. M yrdal (1968) argues th a t th e practice of speed m oney gives incentives to governm ent officials to n o t act efficiently and is therefore one of th e reasons b eh in d th e in e rtia of b u reau c ra tic system s. R egarding th e alleged benefits of b rib e bidding, B aum ol (1990) stresses th a t those who can afford th e highest b rib e should be considered th e m ost suc cessful in rent-seeking. C o rru p tio n reduces grow th because th e m ost able individuals will p u rsu e rent-seeking activ ities ra th e r th a n socially p ro d u ctiv e activities. M urphy, Schleifer an d V ishny (1991) s u b sta n tia te th is argum ent in a m odel of en trep ren eu rsh ip an d grow th.
A m ajo r draw back of th e th e o re tic al lite ra tu re is th e fact th a t it disregards com pletely th a t th e relatio n sh ip betw een co rru p tio n an d grow th depends on its in stitu tio n a l environm ent. If a t all, m ost au th o rs depict th e in stitu tio n a l fram ew ork as a black box, or stu d y one p a rtic u la r in stitu tio n in isolation, m aking it im possible to analyze co rru p tio n in in terp lay w ith o th e r in s titu tio n s.1 However, it is well-known th a t a close web of form al in stitu tio n s, in form al in stitu tio n s an d d isto rtio n s d eterm in e th e way an econom y functions (e.g. N orth, 1990). R em oving one d isto rtio n m ay alte r th is web, so th a t o th er d isto rtio n s m ay be triggered, leaving th e econom y worse off.2 Consequently, th e effects of co rru p tio n in a p a rtic u la r society can n o t be stu d ied w ith o u t tak in g into account (th e rest of) th e in stitu tio n a l fram ew ork of th a t p a rtic u lar society. C o rru p tio n will have different effects in different in stitu tio n a l settin g s an d th e effects of co rru p tio n on th e econom y will therefore differ The m odel we develop takes these vital interdependencies into account.
In particular, we construct a two-layer model to emphasize the decisive role of the institutional environment, including corruption, on the effects of cor ruption on growth.4 The first layer models the way corruption affects the rate of growth in an institutional vacuum. In the second layer, institutions are incorporated and modelled to assess how corruption affects economic growth through its impact on the institutional setting. Our two-layer m odel thus not only captures the commonly acknowledged direct effect of corruption on growth (layer 1), but also introduces a crucial indirect institutional effect of corruption (layer 2).
3Heckelman and Powell (2008) present an overview of the various empirical studies th at have examined the corruption-growth relationship. They show th a t these studies, which generally ignore institutional measures, provide very mixed outcomes. Recent empircal studies have begun to examine corruption's im pact on economic growth including the institutional environment in the analysis. They empirically show th a t institutions play a significant role in explaining the non-monotonic corruption-growth relation. Interesting results are provided by Méon and Sekkat (2005) , Méon and Weill (2006) , Méndez and Sepulveda (2006) , and Aidt, D u tta and Sena (2008). Note th a t this is in contrast to the earlier empirical studies which always found a clear-cut negative relationship between corruption and growth.
4The concept of using a two-layer model is taken from Ehrlich and Lui (1999) , who develop a two layer model to analyse the implications of political systems on individual labour supply decisions.
For the remainder of this paper it is important to be clear about what we
understand under corruption. Corruption has been defined by several authors in different ways, but we adopt the definition of Macrae (1982) . He refers to corruption as 'an arrangement that involves an exchange between two parties (the demander and the supplier) which (i) has an influence on the allocation of resources either im m ediately or in the future; and (ii) involves the use or abuse of public or collective responsibility for private ends' (Macrae, 1982, p.
678). This definition is in line with the World Bank definition that corruption
is 'the abuse of public power for private benefit', but is preferred because it highlights that there are two parties involved, a briber and a bribee. Besides this, Macrae's definition makes clear that the bribee uses his public position for the benefit of his own or his relations and that it affects the allocation of resources.5 Consequently, we focus on bureaucratic corruption, involving both a public and a private party. Furthermore, we note that in our treatment of corruption, we refrain from issues of morality and solely study the economic effects of corruption, in particular economic growth.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 2 establishes in more de tail why corruption cannot be reliably addressed in an institutional vacuum. 5Further refinements of the definition are of course possible. For instance, one can make a distinction between corruption with and w ithout theft, where the official does or does not tu rn over the official price of the good to the government. One can also distinguish between centralized and decentralized corruption. Centralized corruption means th a t once a bribe is paid, the buyer gets full property rights over the set of government goods th at it buys. In decentralized corruption one bribe may not be sufficient to render effect.
C orru p tion and th e in stitu tio n a l se ttin g
In a purely neoclassical setting, transactions occur under the assumption of frictionless exchange, in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly specified and information is likewise costless to acquire. Neoclassical theory has been a major contribution to economic knowledge and seems to work well in the analysis of markets in developed countries. However, when its stringent underlying assum ptions are not satisfied, neoclassical theory fails to satisfac torily explain economic performance. W hat has been m ainly missing is an understanding of the nature of human coordination and cooperation. W hen information is not perfect and when property rights are far from perfectly specified, cooperation is hard to realize. This is where institutions come in. W hen it is costly to transact, institutions matter.
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 1990 ). 6This does not mean th a t the institutions are necessarily efficient. Laws and social norms may be inefficient, bu t they still perform a role in the society by reducing uncer tainty. By reducing uncertainty, individuals will engage in cooperation despite the fact th a t they do not possess perfect information about the other players or despite the fact th a t the game is not repeated. 
The major role of institutions is to reduce uncertainty by

Affecting the transaction costs of economic interactions, institutions
By contrast, bad institutions hamper economic growth because a large share
of resources has to be used for accomplishing transactions, leaving fewer re sources for the actual transformation process and discouraging individuals to undertake productive activities.
The relationship between institutions and economic growth is not only subject of descriptive argumentations, it also has been formalized and em pirically examined. Fedderke (2001) constructs a growth m odel in which
property rights are the institutional feature affecting economic growth. He 7 W hy the interplay between institutions m atters for economic growth is described by G ranovetter (1985) , addressing the problem of embeddedness. Which institutions m atter for growth is outlined in Rodrik (1999) . Eicher and G arcia Penalose (2003) argues th a t a certain threshold level of institutional development has to be overcome, before economic growth can take off. The im portance of a specific feature of the institutional framework, namely property rights, for economic growth is stressed by G radstein (2004) and Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) .
8Nelson and Sam pat (2001) follow this line of reasoning by proposing th a t the theory of production should involve two different aspects: a recipe th a t is anonymous regarding any division of labour, and a division of labour plus a mode of coordination. They propose th a t the former is what scholars often have in mind when they think of technology in the conventional sense. This aspect is called the 'physical' technology employed. The latter aspect, which involves the coordination of hum an action, is referred to as the 'social capital' involved.
argues that there is a mutual interdependence between institutional devel opment and economic development. The model follows the aforementioned notion that the level of production depends on the degree of development of production technology and on the level of property rights and it formalizes that improving institutions positively influences the rate of economic growth.
Empirical testing provides plenty evidence for this conclusion. Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) conclude that the quality of (formal) institutions is by far the most important determinant of differences in income levels be tween countries. In a less recent study, Scully (1988) incorporates informal institutions into the analysis and reports that the institutional framework is not only a statistically significant explanation for intercountry variations in
growth rates of real per capita gross dom estic product, but also that it is a phenomenon of considerable magnitude.
W hile the relationship between institutions and economic growth seems clear and straightforward, one should also realise that the institutional set ting of a country is a close web of formal institutions, informal institutions and distortions. The interplay between these institutional factors determines
whether the institutional environment fosters or depresses growth. In con trast to a neoclassical world in which all resources are used efficiently and where distortions hamper growth by definition, a more realistic picture of distortions and economic growth is provided by the concept of second-best.9
In a second best world, removing one distortion may trigger other distor tions, leaving the economy worse off. The effect of removing distortions on economic growth thus depends on the way the total institutional framework changes. 9Bohm (1967) argues th a t the problem of second best applies in the real world because "th e optimal-feasible allocation of resources is subject to an abundance of 'irremovable' institutional and political constraints, which seem to require other solutions to most alloca tion problems th an w hat follows from a simple P areto optimum with no other constraints taken into account th an those of technology and available resources. Since the institutional web of a country is extrem ely com plicated and specific, it is impossible to analyze all interdependencies that influence the relationship between corruption and growth. We therefore highlight three institutional features that we believe are crucial in studying the effects of corruption on growth, i.e. political stability, property rights and the polit ical system . We m otivate our choice by the fact that these features have been acknowledged in several papers as being important determinants for growth.10
This concept also applies to corruption. In a second best setting, it is by no means certain that removing corruption promotes economic growth. The effect on growth also depends on the way the removal of corruption alters the institutional setting as a whole. Corruption may be a useful element in
To illustrate that the institutional effect may be more than enough to com pensate the stealing effect, we imagine a situation in which society is plagued by either low political stability or the absence of a decent system of property rights. In such a setting, a corrupt system may be the least of all evils, particularly in countries where ethnic differences and violent ri valries are pervasive, so that the perceived alternative to corruption is not W estern-style political confrontation, but daily physical aggression (Colombatto, 2003). Efforts to elim inate corruption will then lead to political insta bility since corruption serves the positive function of holding society together. Also, when a decent system of property rights is missing, corruption may be come a crucial element of the economic system . In such infected environment, corruption could reduce uncertainty and facilitate investments and produc tion, thus providing an alternative system in which the indirect institutional effect of corruption more than com pensates its negative stealing effect.
For political system s, it particularly m atters whether corruption exists in a democratic system or in a totalitarian system .11 The key characteristic of the neoclassical paradigm that it is socially optim al if individuals strive to m axim ize there own benefit applies to democratic systems. Corruption is a distortion, misusing resources and infecting economic agent's incentives. 10 The im portance of property rights for economic growth can be found in G radstein (2004) . Colom batto (2003) presents the political system and the degree of political stability as a crucial determ inant for the relation between corruption and growth.
11The perception indices in both Tanzi (1998) and Mauro (1995) show th a t countries with a totalitarian system have lower scores th an countries with a democratic system, indicating th a t corruption is more present in a to talitarian system th an in a democratic one. Given our focus on the effects of the policital system on the corruption-growth relationship, this is by itself not so relevant though.
Of course, also modern democratic system s are far from the neoclassical ideal and welfare states have been designed to protect vulnarable groups. This creates room for corruption, also since politicians are subject to fairly loose controls. Corruption can then be a useful monitoring device, eliciting predictable behaviour (Colom batto, 2003). This applies only in the short run, however, as in the long-run bureaucrats will change their behaviour in a way that will reduce efficiency (Myrdal, 1968 ). In democratically orientated system s, corruption is therefore detrimental to growth. This is different in totalitarian system s, where economic and political freedoms are limited. In particular the distinction between centralized and decentralized corruption is important. W hen corruption is decentralized, economic agents cannot be certain that bribing will be effective. Bribing one government official may not prevent that also other officials have to be bribed to get som ething done. Uncoordinated corruption leads to high de grees of uncertainty, lowering economic growth. Centralized corruption, by contrast, takes away these uncertainties as corruption has been institution alized to serve a clear, common goal. In a way, producers can hedge the risks of uncertainty, knowing whom to bribe to secure production. In such system , corruption could be conducive to growth, especially when other in stitutions cannot provide for this. The distinction between decentralized and centralized corruption is related to Mancur Olson's (1993) distinction be tween "roving bandits" and "stationary bandits". W hile roving bandits are dictators trying to extract from society as much as possible, a "stationary bandit" realizes that the high levels of uncertainty this implies affects future earnings.
A b asic m o d el for corru p tion and grow th
In this section we construct a model that acknowledges the direct and indi rect effects corruption has on growth. We develop a two-layer model where the first layer models the direct stealing effect of corruption on economic growth and the second layer corruption's indirect institutional effect through its interplay with other institutions. The first layer can be seen as the con ventional treatm ent of corruption as a distortion, whereas the second layer acknowledges that corruption also affects economic growth through its im pact on the working of the institutional system.
T he first layer -corruption and grow th in an in stitu tion al vacuum
The 
T he second layer -incorporating in stitu tion s
For the growth rate, the incorporation of an indirect institutional effect of stealing implies that now also an effect arises through its impact on insti-
tu tion al quality:
As before, stealing affects growth directly by affecting labour input choices We illustrate the overall effect of stealing on growth in Figure 1 , where we 14 The first term in braces of (7) 15The level of S for which growth rates become negative is however higher for corrupt societies th an for normal societies, as can be easily verified by setting the growth rate in (6) to zero, recognising th a t qc = -qN.
(insert Figure 1 about here) To analyze these different set-ups we retain our assumption that govern ment collects taxes and produces public goods, facilitating private produc tion. W hen there is a democratic government in place, outcom es are as in the previous section and require no further elaboration. The growth rate in the institutional vacuum is given by (3), whereas the growth rates when also institutional quality is taken into account is given by (6) . W hen a totalitar ian system is in place, we assume that government -t h e dictator -a l s o uses tax income to serve needs that do not add to private production. W hen the dictator is of the roving bandit type, it will use all tax revenues for its own purposes, extracting as much from society as possible. This disables private production, obviously with disastrous effects on economic growth. For that reason, we will not further elaborate on the 'roving bandit' type of totalitarian system. W hen the dictator is a 'stationary bandit', things becom e different.
T h e p o litica l sy ste m and co rru p tion
Recognizing that public goods facilitate production, a stationary bandit will 21The elasticity of 7 with respect to S is given by see (7) and goes to -1 when S ! 1.
The elasticity of 7 with respect to Q i equals --7 + P-_ Q ----, which is finite for all S. We would like to emphasize that our argumentation and modelling should be considered as a first attem pt to formalize the view that institutional factors must be studied in close interaction with the entire institutional environment.
Therefore, our analysis is all but com plete and many challenges lie ahead. 
